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LARRY R. VONWALD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
V. No. 960851-CA 
KEVIN PLUMB, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Argument: 1) Defendant Plumb cannot establish his 
entitlement to have the Stipulation for Release of Cash 
Bond (r. 348-49) amended on the basis of unilateral 
mistake under any set of facts. 
At page 9 of his answering brief attorney Poole 
states "Plumb did state the circumstances constituting 
the mistake in the Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole dated 
January 26, 1996 which was filed contemporaneously with 
Plumb's Motion to Amend Order (R. 408-13)." At pages 15 
and 16 of said answering brief, about the January 26, 
1996, affidavit, attorney Poole again asserted that it, 
the affidavit, "presented evidence to support Plumb's 
claim of mistake of fact. (R. 408-13)." 
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Poole's allegations as set forth in paragraphs 12. 
and 13. of the affidavit are not credible when compared 
to the provisions of the stipulation (r. 349-50). 
Paragraph 3. of the stipulation refers to the cash 
supersedeas bond filed to stay the enforcement of the 
June 8, 1994 judgment. It requires disbursement as 
directed in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of said paragraph 
3.; and "[u]pon receipt of such funds, Defendant shall 
cause a Satisfaction of Judgment to be filed with the 
Court." Defendant did receive the funds. First of all, 
under the rule of construction announced in Continental 
Bank and Trust Company v. BybeeP 306 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 
1957), "[s]ince [Poole] was both the attorney draftsman 
of and a party to the instrument, the proper construction 
of the [stipulation] should be strictly against him.,f, 
requiring that the supersedeas bond referred to in said 
paragraph 3. is reference to the judgment of June 8, 
1994, as the judgment superseded. This was the only 
judgment in the picture at the time of the stipulation; 
it also must be construed to be the judgment mentioned as 
the judgment to be satisfied in paragraph 5. of the 
stipulation. 
At page 7. of his memorandum in support of the 
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motion to amend order (r. 403), attorney Poole states 
ff[i]f, because of clerical error, there is an ambiguity 
that Defendant was to issue a satisfaction as to the 
January 2, 1996 Order only . . ." There is no 
requirement that the January 2, 1996, ORDER FOR RELEASE 
OF CASH BOND be satisfied because it is not a judgment 
for money against Plumb, or Poole, for that matter, (r. 
350-51) 
Attorney Poole's statements in his brief as to the 
record at pp. 408-426 setting out the basis of the claim 
of mistake are the first indications plaintiff has had as 
to the basis of such claim; but the claim of mistake is 
still not sufficiently stated. 
In Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 
1187 (Utah App. 1993), the Court held that 
"1. The mistake must be of so grave a 
consequence that to enforce the contract as 
actually made would be unconscionable." 
At paragraph 6, pages 10-12, of appellant's opening brief 
it is shown without dispute that attorney Poole would not 
have been entitled to any additional fees over and above 
those covered by the $5500 cash supersedeas bond. It 
therefore would not have been unconscionable to enforce 
the stipulation against him. 
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It should be emphasized there is no mistake, and 
attorney Poole cannot in good faith claim a mistake 
exists. In addition, the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
is properly applicable in this case, "-[defendant and 
attorney Poole] received a benefit [from the Order for 
Release of Cash Bond] and therefore are precluded from 
changing their position to obtain another benefit now." 
MeghcHP yy City Of glenflalS/ 15 Ariz.App. 402, 489 P.2d 
65, 67 (1972), cited with approval in Condas v. Condas, 
618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980). 
2) As to the matter of ambiguityP for the first 
time attorney Poole asserts in his answering brief at 
page 14 the basis of his claim of ambiguity which is that 
it, the ambiguity, "arises when [paragraphs 1. and 4. of 
the Stipulation for Release of Cash Bond (r. 348-49)] are 
read together." There follows then, in attorney Poole's 
words, his convoluted thought process which I will not 
repeat except to state that central to such convoluted 
thought process is Poole's assertion that "[t]he effect 
of the January 2, 1996 Order (r. 550-51) was to award 
Plumb a judgment of $5,315.44 for Plumb's attorney's fees 
on appeal (apart from his attorney's fees below)." This 
goes against the clear meaning and mention of $5,315.44 
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as used in the stipulation which was to allocate to Poole 
that much of the $5500 cash supersedeas bond filed to 
supersede the June 8, 1994 judgment for $4064.90. It 
further violates the applicable rules of construction, 
including that referred to above, to-wit, since Poole was 
both the attorney draftsman and party to the instrument, 
the proper construction should be strictly against him. 
3) It should be apparent to the Court that 
defendant's purported opposition to plaintiff's appeal as 
evidenced by his answering brief, is frivolous, i.e., 
such opposition is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, and not grounded on good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. Plaintiff, 
therefore, requests the Court, on its own motion, and 
pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
to award plaintiff damages in such amount as the Court 
deems fair and reasonable under these extreme 
circumstances of abuse on the part of attorney Poole. 
Conclusion: Plaintiff further requests reversal of 
the orders appealed and remand to the trial court with 
instructions to order the clerk to note the judgment of 
June 8, 1994, satisfied and discharged of record; and for 
the trial court to set and determine the amount of 
5 
plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and to grant 
plaintiff judgment therefore against the defendant. 
DATED March 31, 1997.
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